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IN RE CALDERON-GARZA:




utero custody determinations and proceedings are not directly ad-
dressed in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act (UCCJEA). In Texas, the UCCJEA is the exclusive means by
which a Texas court has jurisdiction over an initial child custody determi-
nation.1 Home state jurisdiction is determined by the child's domicile
post-birth, regardless of where the mother spent the majority of her preg-
nancy.2 Under the Texas Family Code, "home state" is defined as the
state where the child has lived for at least six months immediately prior to
the commencement of the custody proceeding.3 A foreign country is
treated as if it is a state of the United States when determining home state
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.4 On matters outside of paternity, the
UCCJEA and related case law are silent regarding pre-birth custody pro-
ceedings. In the case In re Calderon-Garza, the court made a post-birth
decision regarding jurisdiction. In the absence of statutes and case law,
questions regarding in utero suits affecting the parent-child relationship
remain unanswered.
II. THE CASE
In a paternity suit brought under the UCCJEA by a father, the El Paso
Court of Appeals found Texas to be the child's home state.5 The child
was conceived while his American father, Medhi Farshad Derambakhsh,
and mother, Maria Calderon-Garza, were medical students in Guadala-
jara, Mexico, during April 2000.6 A Mexican citizen, Calderon-Garza re-
mained there and received all of her pre-natal care. 7 She went to El Paso,
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1. In re McCoy, 52 S.W.3d 297, 303 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
2. In re Calderon-Garza, 81 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.).
3. Id.
4. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.105 (Vernon 2003).
5. Calderon-Garza, 81 S.W.3d at 903.
6. Id. at 901.
7. Id.
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Texas, on or about January 18, 2001, and remained there until the child
was born on January 27, 2001.8 Calderon-Garza's parents reside in El
Paso, and she relied on them for financial assistance during her preg-
nancy.9 Calderon-Garza informed Derambakhsh of the birth, and he im-
mediately flew to Texas with his mother to see his new son.t0 Despite the
fact that Calderon-Garza refused to sign Derambakhsh's voluntary pater-
nity affidavit, she asked him for financial assistance with her medical
bills.11 Derambakhsh gave her post-dated checks to help her with the
expenses. On or about March 25, 2001, Calderon-Garza returned to
Mexico with the child, and on March 26, 2001, Derambakhsh filed his
original petition for voluntary paternity in the trial court.1 2 He was un-
successful at his attempts to serve Calderon-Garza, given that she was no
longer in the United States. 13 Derambakhsh secured an order for substi-
tuted service, to which Calderon-Garza responded via special appear-
ance, maintaining that she was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Texas
court. 14 The associate judge in the matter sustained the special appear-
ance, ordering that Derambakhsh's original petition be dismissed with
prejudice. 15 On appeal by Derambakhsh, the trial court found the
following:
* Calderon's legal domicile [wa]s in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.
* Grounds for personal jurisdiction provided in Section 102.011(b)
of the Texas Family Code... [were] established.
* The court had status and subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.
" Texas [wa]s the child's home state.16
In response to the court's findings, Calderon-Garza filed a motion
seeking mandamus relief in order to compel the court to "vacate its or-
der, sustain her special appearance, decline jurisdiction of this case, and
dismiss the suit. ' ' 17 The Court of Appeals denied Calderon-Garza's
request.
III. DISCUSSION
Under the UCCJEA provisions in the Texas Family Code, Mexico is
treated as if it were a U.S. state. 18 Furthermore, in initial child custody
matters, Texas may assert jurisdiction only if Texas is the home state of
the child "on the date of the commencement of the proceeding."1 9 In the










17. Id. at 900.
18. Id. at 902; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.105 (Vernon 2003).
19. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201(a)(l).
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means "immediately before commencement" of the suit.20 Thus, in Cal-
deron-Garza, jurisdiction was not determined by the location of the
mother, but rather by the location of the child. The appellate court found
that though the child was in Mexico on the exact date the suit affecting
the parent/child relationship was filed, the child's home state was Texas
because he had resided in Texas from birth until immediately before -
one day before, to be exact - his father filed suit.21
The court addressed two arguments in favor of Mexico as the child's
home state, and determined that neither argument would survive statu-
tory examination. 22 First, the court found that the child was never physi-
cally present in Mexico, despite the mother's pre-natal presence there. 23
Second, the court found that since the child was never physically present
in Mexico, neither was he temporarily absent from Mexico. 24
A. PHYSICAL PRESENCE UNDER THE UCCJEA
The UCCJEA is not altogether clear on what constitutes physical pres-
ence. What if a purported parent were to file for a custody determination
pre-birth? Would Texas law support a finding granting custody, whether
sole or joint, to a parent before the child was even born? What if in the
Calderon-Garza case the father had known earlier about the mother's
pregnancy and attempted to file for custody while the mother was still
residing in Mexico? The policy implications are startling. If Texas law
does support paternity suits pre-birth, a court could order a mother to
submit to DNA testing post-birth even before the mother has decided
whether or not to carry her child to term. An analysis of the UCCJEA
language is crucial, particularly in light of its sister statute, the Uniform
Parentage Act.
Although the Texas Family Code contains definitions for both "child"
and "fetus," the language of the UCCJEA as it appears within the Texas
Family Code addresses only custody determinations pertaining to a child.
Case law has established that when construing a statute, a reviewing court
must consider the statute as a whole rather than by its individual provi-
sions.25 "One provision should not be given meaning out of harmony or
inconsistent with other provisions. '26 The rules of statutory construction
require courts to presume that the whole statute is meant to be effec-
tive.27 As a result, the UCCJEA should be construed not to apply to
unborn children.
The language of the entire UCCJEA text contains references to "child"
and does not make any reference to "fetuses." The implication is that the
20. Id. § 152.102(7).
21. Calderon-Garza, 81 S.W.3d at 902-03.
22. Id. at 903-04.
23. Id. at 903.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001)).
26. Id.
27. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 2003).
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Texas legislature did not intend for the UCCJEA to contemplate custody
orders pre-birth.
"Child" is defined more than once in the Texas Family Code, depend-
ing on the particular topic addressed. For example, in terms of the par-
ent/child relationship, "child" is defined in section 101.003 as "a person
under [eighteen] years of age who is not and has not been married or who
has not had the disabilities of minority removed for general purposes. '2 8
In section 162.301, for adoption purposes, "child" means a minor "who
cannot be placed for adoption with appropriate adoptive parents without
the provision of adoption assistance because of factors including ethnic
background, age, membership in a minority or sibling group, the presence
of a medical condition, or a physical, mental, or emotional disability. ' 29
The intent of the legislature must have been to clarify "child" specifically
in the context of adoption assistance agreements, and to avoid other defi-
nitions of "child" used elsewhere in the code.
The UCCJEA does not apply to unborn children because it does not
address the initial custody determinations of fetuses. The Texas Family
Code defines a "fetus," separately from a "child," as "an individual
human organism from fertilization until birth."'30 In a subsequent section,
"fetus" is used without redefinition. 31 Notably, "fetus" is not used in the
UCCJEA section of the Texas Family Code in reference to custody or
jurisdictional issues. It is reasonable to infer that the legislature did not
intend for the UCCJEA to apply to unborn children. 32
B. JURISDICTION UNDER THE UCCJEA
The Texas UCCJEA sets forth a four-tier jurisdictional determination
structure for initial child custody actions:
(1) home state jurisdiction;
(2) significant connection jurisdiction;
(3) jurisdiction due to declination of jurisdiction; and
(4) default jurisdiction.33
Once Texas has jurisdiction, it is exclusive and continuing until either a
Texas court determines that "neither the child, nor the child and one par-
ent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent, have a significant con-
nection with. . . [Texas] and that substantial evidence is no longer
available in. . .[Texas] concerning the child's care, protection, training,
and personal relationships," or when a court determines that "the child,
the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent" no longer reside in
Texas.34
28. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.003 (Vernon 2003).
29. Id. § 162.301.
30. Id. § 33.001(2).
31. Id. § 161.006.
32. See Anselmo v. Anselmo, No. FA000181708, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 863 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2001) (not designated for publication).
33. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201.
34. Id. § 152.202
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1. Home State Jurisdiction
Texas has home state jurisdiction if it was the home state of the child
on the date the first pleading in the proceeding was filed, or was the
child's home state within six months prior to the initiation of the action.35
Texas is also the child's home state if the child is under six months old and
has lived in the state from birth.36 Under the UCCJEA, the temporary
absence provision of the Texas Family Code cannot be construed to in-
clude periods before the child was first present in the claimed home
state.3
7
Determination of home state jurisdiction is limited to residency after
birth. 38 In the Calderon-Garza case, Derambakhsh had sued the mother
for joint managing conservatorship of their Texas-born infant son, and the
court did not allow the mother's claim that the child's presence in Texas
was only temporary. 39 Calderon-Garza, a Mexican national, argued that
pre-natal care occurred in Mexico and that she was not in Texas for the
majority of her pregnancy.40 She wanted the court to consider the child's
in utero presence in Mexico as the child's actual residency, with the pe-
riod in Texas as a temporary absence.41 Calderon-Garza claimed that she
only came to Texas to bear her child and receive financial assistance from
her parents.42 However, the court did not consider the child's existence
in utero as a legal presence in Mexico. 43 The child's presence was not
determined until after he was born. As a result, Texas had home state
jurisdiction over the initial custody decree because the child was born in
Texas and lived in Texas until the day before the biological father filed
the first pleading.44 Therefore, the appellate court denied Calderon-
Garza relief, and she was not allowed to transfer the proceedings to a
Mexican court.45
2. Significant Connection Jurisdiction
While home state jurisdiction is given priority, Texas may still have ju-
risdiction over the initial proceeding under the second tier of the
UCCJEA jurisdictional criteria. If the child and at least one parent have
significant connections to Texas and substantial evidence in Texas exists
"concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relation-
ships," Texas has jurisdiction over the initial custody determination. 46 In
35. Id. § 152.201(a)(1).
36. Id. § 152.102(7).
37. Id.; In re Calderon-Garza, 81 S.W.3d 899, 903 (Tex. App. - El Paso 2002, no pet.).
38. See Calderon-Garza, 81 S.W.3d at 903.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 901, 903.




45. Id. at 904.
46. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201(a)(2)(A)-(B) (Vernon 2003).
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order for it to be appropriate for Texas to assert significant connection
jurisdiction, the claiming party must show that:
(1) the child has no home state or the home state has declined to
exercise jurisdiction;
(2) it is in the best interest of the child because the child and at
least one of its parents have a significant connection with Texas
beyond mere physical presence; and
(3) there is available in Texas substantial evidence concerning the
child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships.47
Jurisdiction in Texas is based on the circumstances that exist when the
suit is filed in Texas. 48 Significant connection jurisdiction is measured by
occurrences within the forum state, such as:
(1) school attendance;
(2) close familial relationships;
(3) regular interaction with a parent, grandparent, stepparent or
stepsiblings; and
(4) medical, dental and mental health visits. 49
In In re Brilliant, the El Paso Court of Appeals determined that the
child did not have a home state, although the Texas court allowed signifi-
cant connection jurisdiction.50 The child was conceived and born in Mas-
sachusetts, but she and her mother soon moved to Texas to be with the
child's father.51 Forty-five days after moving to Texas, the mother be-
came despondent and moved with the child back to Massachusetts. The
mother did so notwithstanding a court order secured by the father in
Texas that forbade the mother from removing the child to another state. 52
During the forty-five day period that the child was in Texas, the child saw
her extended family on a frequent basis and she played with her rela-
tives. 53 The mother and father had plans to raise their family in Texas,
and the child's paternal grandfather helped the mother with caring for the
child.54 He taught the mother such things as how to mix formula and
sterilize bottles properly.5 5 Finally, the child's medical records were
transferred to Texas.56 The Texas court found this evidence sufficient
enough to constitute significant connections within the State of Texas. 57
47. In re Brilliant, 86 S.W.3d 680, 690 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.); In re Mc-
Coy, 52 S.W.3d 297, 304 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
48. Brilliant, 86 S.W.3d at 692.
49. Id.; In re Bellamy, 67 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
50. 86 S.W.3d at 692.
51. Id. at 682.
52. Id. at 683.




57. Id. at 692; see also Venditti v. Plonski, No. FA010076354S, 2002 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 339 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2002) (not designated for publication).
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3. Declination Jurisdiction
If all courts of another state or states that have home state or signifi-
cant connection jurisdiction have declined to assert jurisdiction because
the more appropriate forum is Texas, then Texas may assert declination
jurisdiction. 58 The person seeking to claim such jurisdiction must base his
assertion on forum non-conveniens or unjustifiable conduct. 59
In Wood v. Redwine, an Oklahoma court found that none of the parties
had sought the jurisdiction of another state, and thus, no other state de-
clined to exercise jurisdiction.60 The parties' failure to seek outside juris-
diction was not dispositive, so the forum state did not have jurisdiction
under the declination jurisdiction criteria of the UCCJEA. 61 The black
letter of declination jurisdiction requires that another state's courts de-
cline to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Default Jurisdiction
If no other state court has jurisdiction under the first three criteria -
home state, significant connection, or declination - then Texas may assert
jurisdiction by default. 62
In Redwine, the court ultimately granted jurisdiction by default be-
cause none of the first three jurisdictional criteria were met. The child
did not have a home state, nor did it have significant connections to the
forum state. In addition, the parties had not sought, and thus were not
declined, jurisdiction in another state's courts. As a result, the court must
have granted jurisdiction by default. 63
C. INCONVENIENT FORUM
The Texas Family Code provides that a court with proper jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA may decline jurisdiction if it determines that another
state is the more convenient forum.64 Before determining whether the
Texas court is an inconvenient forum, the court must decide whether the
court of another state could exercise jurisdiction. 65 To reach this determi-
nation, the court is allowed to receive information for consideration. 66
Relevant information includes:
(1) proof of past or potential domestic violence;
(2) how long the child has resided outside of Texas;
(3) the distance between Texas and the state that would assume
jurisdiction;
58. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201(a)(3) (Vernon 2003).
59. Id.
60. 2001 OK CIV APP 115, 12, 33 P.3d 53, 56.
61. Id.
62. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201(a)(4).
63. Wood, 33 P.3d at 57.
64. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.207(a); In re McCoy, 52 S.W.3d 297, 305-06 (Tex.
App. - Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
65. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.207(b).
66. Id.
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(4) the parties' financial status and the nature and location of the
evidence relevant to the pending litigation;
(5) the ability of the respective courts to decide the matters expedi-
tiously; and
(6) the familiarity of the courts with the facts and issues in the liti-
gation.67 If the Texas court determines that a court of another
state is the more appropriate forum, the proceedings are stayed
upon the condition that proceedings promptly commence in the
more convenient forum state. 68
In Shanoski v. Miller, a Maine court declined to exercise jurisdiction
after finding that the Maine court was an inconvenient forum.69 The
court based its decision on the following information:
(1) the child currently lived in North Carolina, and had lived there
for eighty percent of her life;
(2) the father had not raised travel expenses to North Carolina on
appeal;
(3) appellant did not claim that financial circumstances would dic-
tate retaining the proceedings in Maine;
(4) the jurisdictional agreement between the parties did not cover
future disputes, and thus, was inapplicable;
(5) more evidence pertaining to the current and future care of the
children existed in North Carolina, including the child's teach-
ers, and testimony from Maine witnesses could be by deposition
or telephone; and
(6) because the witnesses were in North Carolina, it would be more
expeditious for the North Carolina court to conduct the
proceedings. 70
Maine was the less convenient forum even though the Maine court had
been presented with more information than the court in North Carolina.
D. TERMINATION OF EXCLUSIVE CONTINUING JUrRISDICTION
Texas allows its courts to terminate exclusive continuing jurisdiction
upon a finding that the child, the child and one parent, or the child and a
person acting as a parent no longer have a significant connection with
Texas and substantial evidence regarding the child's protection, care,
training, and personal relationships is no longer available in Texas. 71 The
child's connection with the forum state must be more than de minimus
contact and must constitute a significant connection.72 Texas had contin-
uing exclusive jurisdiction in In re Bellamy, a Texarkana Court of Ap-
peals case, because it granted the original custody decree and the child
maintained a significant connection with Texas. 73 The child's home state
67. Id. § 152.207(b)(1)-(4), (6)-(8).
68. Id. § 152.207(c).
69. 2001 ME 139, 27, 780 A.2d 275, 280.
70. Id. at 279-80.
71. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.202(a)(1).
72. In re Marriage of Medill, 40 P.3d 1087, 1093 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
73. 67 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
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was Louisiana and the child's mother and the mother's current boyfriend
had criminal records in Louisiana. 74 However, the child attended school
in Texas and lived only a few miles from her maternal grandparents in
Texas.75 There was daily interaction between the family in Texas and the
child, and the child had strong personal relationships with her maternal
grandparents, father, stepmother, and stepbrothers, all of whom lived in
Texas.76 Substantial evidence in Texas thus existed regarding the child's
care, protection, training, and personal relationships. 77
In In re Marriage of Medill, Oregon did not have continuing exclusive
jurisdiction in a case wherein the children had lived in Germany the ma-
jority of their lives and had only been present in Oregon for four
months.78 The father of the children had secured an initial custody deter-
mination under the UCCJEA, but when he sought to modify custody, the
UCCJEA permitted Oregon to terminate exclusive continuing jurisdic-
tion and find that Germany was the more appropriate forum.79 Even
though the father, the father's wife, and his parents resided in Oregon,
and the children had been psychologically evaluated in Oregon, the Ore-
gon court ruled that the connections constituted limited contacts and not
the significant connections and evidence required under the UCCJEA.80
E. GENETIC TESTING OUTSIDE OF TEXAS
Had the baby in Calderon-Garza been born outside of Texas, such as in
Mexico or another U.S. state, and had Derambakhsh questioned or de-
nied parentage of Calderon-Garza's child, any parentage action by the
mother or father would have come under the Texas Uniform Parentage
Act (UPA). The UPA sets forth specific requirements for genetic testing
to determine parentage. 81 Testing must be of a type "reasonably relied
on by experts in the field of genetic testing" and "performed by a labora-
tory accredited by:
(1) the American Association of Blood Banks,...;
(2) the American Society for Histocompatibility and Immunoge-
netics... ; or
(3) an accrediting body designated by the federal secretary of
health and human services."'82
The reported results of genetic testing made under the requirements






78. 40 P.3d at 1094, 1096.
79. Id. at 1096.
80. Id. at 1093-94.
81. See TEx. FAM. CODF ANN. § 160.503 (Vernon 2003).
82. Id. § 160.503(a)(1)-(3).
83. Id. § 160.504(a).
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The statute does not indicate that the testing must occur within Texas,
only that testing must comport with the statute in order to meet chain of
custody requirements for admissibility.84 The documentation must
include:
(1) the name and photograph of each individual whose specimens
have been taken;
(2) the name of each individual who collected specimens;
(3) the places in which the specimens were collected and the date
of each collection;
(4) the name of each individual who received the specimens in the
testing laboratory; and
(5) the dates the specimens were received.8 5
Costs of testing must be advanced by the person requesting the test or
as ordered by the court.86
Case law establishes that adherence to the traditional rules for admit-
ting evidence, along with compliance with the state's genetic testing re-
porting requirements is sufficient for admissibility in parentage
proceedings.87 Great weight has been given to the national accreditation
of the facilities and their compliance with statutory requirements, regard-
less of the facility's location in relation to the state exercising
jurisdiction.88
Under the hypothesized change in facts, if Calderon-Garza were ada-
mant about not submitting her child to the Texas courts, she could have
rationally argued that Texas does not have personal jurisdiction over the
child and, therefore, cannot order the baby to submit to testing in Texas
or elsewhere.89 To establish personal jurisdiction over Calderon-Garza's
child, due process mandates that the party must have certain minimum
contacts with the forum state in order to keep from offending "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." 90
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the UCCJEA applies to foreign states as if the foreign state
were one of the United States, analysis of its potential effect on foreign
parties is relevant. Mexican and Canadian citizens should thus consider
the potential effect of the UCCJEA on a party's right to file an in utero
custody or parentage action. Texas case law has been silent regarding
pre-birth custody determinations, though statutory law contemplates fe-
tuses with regard to pregnancy termination. While the Texas Family
84. Id. § 160.504(b).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 160.506(a).
87. Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Authentication of Blood Sample Taken From
Human Body for Purposes Other Than Determining Blood Alcohol Content, 77
A.L.R. 5th 201, §§ 23-24 (2000).
88. Id.
89. See Prine v. Prine, 28935 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/22/97), no writ, 687 So. 2d 637, 638.
90. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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Code does not explicitly deny the right of a parent for an in utero custody
determination, it remains to be seen how the legislature or the courts will
resolve this neglected question. In In re Calderon-Garza, a Texas appeals
court did not acknowledge the in utero presence of a child. If parentage
determinations are allowed, is it possible that pre-birth custody determi-
nations will be allowed as well?
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